The Guinean military’s overthrow of President Alpha Condé on September 5, 2021 is the country’s third coup d’état since its independence in 1958, an outcome of autocratic overreach, erosion of democratic norms, systemic corruption and economic mismanagement (Devermont, 2021).
Alpha Condé, the first peacefully and democratically elected president of Guinea, began to govern the country in 2010, and was re-elected in 2015. The Constitution of Guinea limits the presidential term to two years, however, with the intention of remaining in power, President Condé organized a constitutional referendum that allowed the extension of the presidential limit. After the constitutional amendment was passed, Condé won the 2020 presidential election and therefore confirmed his third mandate as President. The elections were followed by protests against the President and the main opposition candidate, Cellou Dalein Diallo, claimed victory, rejecting the official results and alleging electoral fraud. The lack of support of Condé lead to a military takeover by the Group of Special Forces (GFS) of Guinea, headed by Mamady Doumbouya, who announced the arrest of the President Condé and the dissolution of the Government and Constitution.
In his address to the nation through a television broadcast, Doumbouya defended that Conde’s removal was necessary and went on to blame his leadership for corruption, Guinea’s poverty, misrule and a lack of development while promising a reform of the ruling system and Guinea’s institutions.
International community’s response
Several international organizations, including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations, came to denounce the military coup in Guinea and to call for the release of President Condé.
The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, posed on twitter that “I am personally following the situation in Guinea very closely. I strongly condemn any takeover of the government by force of the gun and call for the immediate release of President Alpha Conde.”
Concerning the European Union, in a tweet, the EU High Representative promptly condemned the takeover by force and called for the immediate release of the country’s president.
On the other hand, the African Union, in the “Communiqué conjoint sur le coup d’État en Guinée”, has condemned the coup d’état, called for the immediate release of the President Conde and has invited the Peace and Security Council to take the appropriate measures to tackle the political situation. Finally, on 10 September 2021, in the Communiqué of the 1030th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU on the situation in the Republic of Guinea, the AU suspended Guinea’s membership, in line with its Constitutive Act.
In the extraordinary session of 8 September 2021, ECOWAS has condemned the coup and has called for Conde’s “immediate and unconditional release, as well as that of all arrested persons”. In addition, the Republic of Guinea also has been suspended from all ECOWAS governing bodies with immediate effect and will be subject to a ECOWAS mission in its territory in order to assess the situation.
African Union’s role
In 2000, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), adopted the Lomé Declaration on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government, whose new sanction consisted of the suspension of the country concerned from the OAU. This approach was reaffirmed in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, including the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments” as a governing principle stipulated in its Article 4(p), thereby highlighting the continent’s zero-tolerance policy on military overthrows of democratic governments (Ani, 2021). Furthermore, its article 30 states that “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union”.
The refusal to return to a constitutional order could result in sections targeted at the regime including visa denials, restrictions on government-to-government contracts, and trade restrictions, among others (Ani, 2021). Concretely, article 23 states that a “Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly”.
Moreover, article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act provides room for the AU to intervene in a member state to protect democratic principles when unconstitutional changes of government occur. In particular, this article stipulates the AU’s right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances as well as a “serious threat to legitimate order”. Therefore, the last clause of this article allows the AU to anticipate and intervene in political situations, such as unconstitutional changes of government (Ani, 2021) after the AU Assembly authorization requiring a two-third majority.
Not only that, but the AU also supports processes towards the restoration of political authority through the organization, management and monitoring of the electoral processes (Birikorang, 2013). Finally, the AU Assembly can also impose sanctions on a state that encourages or supports unconstitutional changes of government in any other member state.
Additionally, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) stipulates that it shall ‘institute sanctions, in conjunction with the AU Chairperson, whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state’, however, without providing a definition of such sanctions.
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which since its entry into force in 2012 has been ratified by 34 of the AU’s 55 member states, including Guinea, identifies unconstitutional changes of government as one of the main causes of insecurity, instability and conflict, and extends its definition to include “Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government”. In this regard, supporters of Mamady Doumbouya’s coup claim that the constitutional amendment to extend the Conde’s Presidency mandate is to be considered an unconstitutional change of government and therefore, legitimizing the coup d’état until new elections. Article 28 of the Charter states that the AU may apply sanctions and “bring to justice the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government or take necessary steps to affect their extradition”. In that sense, the Charter provides for sanctions for perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government, including banning them from participating in democratic elections to restore constitutional order and from holding key government positions (Zamfir, 2017).
Concerning the role of the ECOWAS, several options are available when confronted with unconstitutional changes of government. First, imposition of sanctions, such as refusing to support a member state’s candidate for an elective post as well as economic or financial sanctions. Second, the suspension of the member state from all decision-making bodies of ECOWAS, as it has recently done with the Republic of Guinea. Third, ECOWAS in conjunction with the AU also contributes to the organization of free, fair and transparent elections. Finally, ECOWAS can exert political and diplomatic pressure on member states to ensure that any attempt to maintain an unconstitutional change of government by sitting a regime can be prevented (Birikorang, 2013).
Suggestions
The overthrow of Condé highlights the failures of the international community itself and, in particular, of ECOWAS and the African Union to prevent, manage and resolve political crises on the continent. Changes to the Constitution by heads of state to remain in power, mainly modifying the presidential term limit, are a common practice and an increasingly popular trend in Africa to disguise an authoritarian regime.
The African Union should closely assess and monitor these situations to ensure that any amendment to a constitution is done according to a democratic process and respecting democratic principles. In the aftermath of an unconstitutional change of government, ECOWAS and the African Union should coordinate and ensure consistency in their application of sanctions so as to avoid supporting and perpetuating unconstitutional regime changes. While the prohibition of unconstitutional changes in government is critical, many leaders have continued to abuse constitutional measures to thwart credible transitional processes (Ani, 2021). In this regard, the African Union authorities should focus on the organization and supervision of free and democratic elections in a short period of time.
Ultimately, the AU authorities should receive the support of the United Nations as well as of the European Union in a more direct and concise way than to be confined to Twitter’s condemnation of the coup.
Bibliography:
African Union (September, 2021), “Communiqué of the 1030th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on the situation in the Republic of Guinea”, available at: https://www.peaceau.org/fr/article/communique-de-la-1030eme-reunion-tenue-le-10-septembre-2021-sur-la-situation-en-republique-de-guinee
African Union, (September, 2021), “Communiqué conjoint sur le coup d’État en Guinée”
Ani, N. (March, 2021), “Coup or Not Coup: The African Union and the Dilemma of
“Popular Uprisings” in Africa”, Democracy and Security.
Birikorang, E. (March, 2013), “Coups d’état in Africa – A Thing of the Past?”, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
Devermont, J. (September, 2021), “Guinea: The Causes and Consequences of West Africa’s latest coup”, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Economic Community of West African States, (September, 2021), “Extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government”
Komenan, D. (September, 2021), “Análisis del golpe de estado en Guinea”, AfricaYe, available at: https://www.africaye.org/analisis-golpe-guinea/
Samb, S. (September, 2021), “
Guinea military consolidates takeover, opposition leader signals openness to transition”, Reuters, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guinean-junta-replaces-provincial-governors-after-coup-media-say-2021-09-07/
Samb, S. (September, 2021), “Elite Guinea army unit says it has toppled president”, Reuters, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/heavy-gunfire-heard-guinea-capital-conakry-reuters-witness-2021-09-05/
Sanz, A. (September, 2021), “Guinea: the scene of a new coup d’état”, Atalayar, available at: https://atalayar.com/en/content/guinea-scene-new-coup-détat
Zamfir, I. (September, 2021), “Political crisis in Guinea”, European Parliamentary Research Service.
Zamfir, I. (November, 2017), “Actions of the African Union against coups d’état”, European Parliamentary Research Service.
By Blanca Prat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
