Holding advantageous and geostrategic location, Turkey is the land bridge from Europe to the Middle East, South Asia and even Africa. It is a powerful regional power in the Black Sea area, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. During the times of Ottomans, the above-mentioned territories were under the control of Ottoman Empire what is now known as Turkey (Goffman, 2002). At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turkish territories fell under the occupation of Britain, France, Italy and Greece under the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 (Montgomery, 1972). Following the Second World War, Turkey reformed itself successfully as a modern nation state. It took a political direction to the West and was its formidable and loyal partner in its dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union (Kuniholm, 2019).
Turkey revitalized its foreign policy in 2014, when after coming into power, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) reshaped Turkey more than other leader since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Heper and Toktaş, 2003). Erdogan has openly revealed its ambitious aspirations to enhance Turkey’s position as a regional power, economically and politically.
At the same time, Erdogan has set special emphasis on the role of Istanbul which is located between Europe and Asia and has long been enjoying a strategic positioning as a southeastern gate of Europe and as the only maritime passage for Black Sea states to the wider Mediterranean. Apart from its geographical location, Turkey’s President has always been advancing the importance of Istanbul through carrying out many large projects in recent years which would raise the status and significance of Istanbul (Dogan and Stupar, 2017). For instance, the third bridge also known as the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge with 8 motorway and 2 railway lanes was opened in 2016 and is the widest suspension bridge in the world (59 m) and the longest spanning bridge (1408 m) with the tallest tower, higher than 322 m (ibid). In 2018, Istanbul Airport was opened to the public and became the largest airport in the world. Later the same year, Erdogan announced the building of the megaproject known as “Istanbul Canal” (ibid).
The Istanbul Canal project envisions constructing a new canal passing through the European side of Istanbul. This canal is planned to become an alternative to Bosphorus which at this moment is the only waterway ensuring the passage of warships and merchant vessels out of and into the Black Sea (Imanzade, 2021). Canal Istanbul would run parallel to the Bosphorus for a total of 45 km (28 miles) with a depth of 20.75 meters (68 feet) and a width of 275-350 meters (900 to 1150 feet) (ibid). The project mission is to relief the Bosphorus Strait maritime traffic in order to improve environment and transportation conditions in the area of Istanbul, the most populated Turkish city. The strait is passed by more than 40000 vessels annually, transporting 139 million cubic meters of oil (Kalinov, 2019).
It needs to be mentioned, that the canal project was first initiated in 1994 by then Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, however, the idea did not take shape until Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official announcement in 2011 (Imanzade, 2021). Erdogan considers Istanbul Canal project as historical importance, puts it a significant role and emphasizes the geopolitical importance of the project by stating that “if Turkey is going to be a global actor, the Canal Istanbul Project is a necessity, rather than only a dream” (Kundak and Baypınar, 2011).
Being sufficiently ambitious, this project has raised controversial opinions as in Turkey so as at international arena (Keller, 2011). Erdogan government has been a target of criticism due to the initiation of the project. Domestically, the main target of the criticism is a possible damage to the ecosystem, city construction and waste of money (Orhon, 2014). The mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, is in fact among the canal’s most vocal critics. In December 2019, he called it “a murder project,” and has since been campaigning against the project (Global Voices, 2021 “Experts warn Turkey’s ambitious Istanbul Kanal will result in environmental destruction”).
One of arguments of the criticism claim that the new canal threatens the city’s water supplies and risks wider environmental consequences in the region’s delicate balance of interconnected seas (“The geopolitical and environmental dangers of Turkey’s Bosphorus bypass canal”, 2021). The seaway might damage underground water resources of Istanbul and will threaten the Marmara Sea along with other social and urbanization risks. Furthermore, the Project will overthrow the underground water sources and aquifers and contaminate them. Before the canal reaches the Black Sea it will also contact with the Terkos Lake ,which is another considerable water source of the city, and damages this lake and the ground waters near it (Global Voices, 2021 “Experts warn Turkey’s ambitious Istanbul Kanal will result in environmental destruction”). In the last decade, Istanbul has faced with water shortages a couple of times especially in the summers. It is a significant problem with the rapidly growing population of Istanbul (ibid).
Another argument is that the project of Istanbul Canal damages and destroys the agricultural lands, forests, pastures, water sources and biodiversity on the sea and land (Politico 2017, “Suez, Panama … Istanbul? Turkey’s grand canal plan” ). Therefore, it can cause a natural disaster for Istanbul. Citizens and opposition leaders oppose to the project and are organizing actions against it in cooperation some global organizations (BBC 2021, “Turkey detains admirals who criticized giant Istanbul canal”).
Moreover, foreign criticism has more of a political nature indicating that Turkey wants to bypass the Montreux Convention and turn the entrenched balance of power into its advantage (Imanzade, 2021). So far, the Montreux Convention places limitations on non-Black Sea states and entities such as the US, the European powers and NATO operations in the Black Sea. This condition is mostly unwelcomed by Russia who is not excited with the construction of a new canal as it might bring disturbance to the power order and undermine Russia’s positions in the wider Black Sea region.
The Montreux Convention
The Montreux Convention was signed in 1936 as a revision to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, returning the rights over the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) to the Turkish government (Imanzade, 2021). The Convention regulates the passage of merchant and military vessels through the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention created a unique regime of passage not only for the Turkish Straits but also for the Black Sea. It is the only international treaty that imposes limits on the total number and tonnage of military vessels as well the duration of their stay in a sea that would otherwise be open to international navigation (Oral, 2017). The Convention primarily served Turkish and Soviet interests by giving Turkey military control over the straits and assuring Soviet and later Russian dominance over the Black Sea. It was mean to restrict the ability of western international powers to freely navigate in the Black Sea, either to undermine Soviet and Russian dominance there or to pose a military threat to the Soviet and later Russian mainland.
The convention allowed Turkey to close the straits to all warships at a time of war and to permit merchant ships free passage. Section I of the treaty regulations the conditions of merchant vessels, while Section II defines the conditions of passage for warships. According to the Convention, the Black Sea states (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia) ships of any tonnage may pass by the straits after notifying the Turkish authorities enjoy freedom of passage for their warships with some size and amount restrictions (Imanzade, 2021). Unlikely, Non Black Sea states face more restrictions and they cannot keep warships in the Black Sea more than twenty one days (ibid). However, the Montreux Convention provides none of the regulations regarding the passage through other canals due to their physical absence at the time of signing it, thus it’s likely possible that if a warship passes through any other canal than Bosporus, no obligations can be put on that vessel concerning neither the duration of stay nor the size of passing vessels on a lawful ground ignoring the provisions of Montreux Convention (Imanzade, 2021). The fact that the new canal is bypassing the Montreux Convention, indicates that controlling the passage of the new canal completely corresponds to Turkish interests rather than common international interests regulated by international treaties and conventions. Turkey will have the ultimate capacity to strategically set regulations on maritime traffic at its discretion and increase its own geopolitical influence in the area. The Istanbul Canal is an opportunity for Ankara to bypass the limits imposed to its strategic control of the straits by the Convention (Akgun and Tiryaki, 2011).
Nevertheless, there is a huge uncertainty how Ankara is planning to set the rules for the new Canal. Turkey sees no reasons complying with the Montreux provisions anymore as it has set a new agenda to adapt to a new world order: presenting Turkey as a unitary actor to maximize its power in the region. Thus, it’s hard to predict whether the Istanbul Canal will provide a stable transition from the Montreux Convention to another international legal agreement or treaty.
Geopolitical Implications
The geopolitical importance of Istanbul Canal promises several benefits for Turkey. First and foremost, it gives Ankara an opportunity to raise its geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis the international community by having an exclusive authority over this geo-strategically pivotal strait and to place itself as a game changer with strategic implications in both the Black and the Mediterranean Seas (Keller, 2011). It advances Turkey’s hegemonic position in the region and gives exclusive authority over the control of the movement in the black sea (Imanzade, 2021). Thus, allowing unlimited access to the Black Sea for non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces. The Turkish Straits which consist of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus, are all parts of the sovereign sea territory of Turkey. This gives it control of the waterways from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and further on to the oceans that are critical especially for Russia. Historically, Turkey’s position in the Black sea, in the Balkans and in the Caucasus is challenged by Russia. Russia’s political maneuvers are always on motion in the Caucasus, in the Balkans and in Syria for the purpose of advancing its influence and to bring disturbance in the order (Mileski and Del Re, 2013). The current Istanbul canal project undermines Russia’s presence in the region and threatens Russia’s support of its allies considering the supply of Russian troops in Syria is carried out through the Bosporus. What’s more the new canal might lead to a greater presence of NATO navies in the Black Sea, the fact is greatly uncomfortable for Russia as it threatens Russian national security and expands the North Atlantic Alliance’s role in the Black Sea. A free passage through the Istanbul Canal means more power in the Black Sea which would increase NATO’s power in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.
Unlike Russia, Turkey’s relation with the West and the EU is rather moderate. Erdogan tries to avoid radical steps and deterioration of the relation. But at the same time, presents itself as an individual player in the region. So far, neither the West nor the EU seem to oppose Erdogan’s plans whose arguments point on technical matters, stating that the project will reduce traffic in the Bosporus, carry on an urbanization process for parts of Istanbul and reduce the risk of ship accidents or non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces. Beyond technical matters, the foreign criticism is moreover related to international law and power politics. The legal aspect of the construction is regularly discussed at international arena. As Erdogan declared the new canal would not be subject to the limitations of the 1936 Montreux Convention and it might even encourage Turkey to denounce the more-than-80-year-old agreement with respect to the existing route. Hence, the Istanbul Canal might become a cause of new Moscow-Turkish and East-West tensions in the near future.
References
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Politico (2017), “Suez, Panama … Istanbul? Turkey’s grand canal plan”, accessed 24 July 2021 <https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20210704-the-geopolitical-and-environmental-dangers-of-turkey-s-bosphorus-bypass-canal/>.
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
