The confirmation of Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, of recent discussions with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, in Baghdad (Iraq) last August (Al Jazeera, 2021) could be envisaged as a decades-long awaited catalyst for a directional change in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This would represent a major turning point not only for the diplomatic terms of the two countries, but also for the entirety of the Middle Eastern area. Indeed, Tehran and Riyadh have established themselves as regional giants in one of the world’s most turbulent yet crucial regions, thereby making Saudi-Iranian relations a major issue characterizing the vital scene of the MENA region. The importance of the role that both play in the Middle East is such that their relations became crucial in the formation and safeguard of the regional order in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean area. Thus, the possibility of the two regional powers coming to terms would represent a significant starting point for re-establishing such order. However, a diplomatic standstill between them has been unimaginable for a long time given that they have been stuck in a decades-long fierce “Middle Eastern Cold War” for regional dominance on numerous fronts, such as regional politics, oil prices, and leadership of the Islamic world. Middle Eastern politics has devolved into bloc politics, with Saudi Arabia and Iran vying for control of and expansion of their respective zones of influence. The Iranian revolution of 1979 heightened this political rivalry by adding a sectarian dimension. Saddam Hussein’s death exacerbated their religious-political enmity, which has now evolved into a geostrategic issue. The Arab Spring and its manifestations dramatically altered the Middle East’s environment. Conflicts in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria enticed the two regional powers to expand their own zones of influence at the expense of the other (Mirza, Abbas, and Qaisrani, 2021).
Reasons for the so-called “Middle Eastern Cold War”
“Some observers have gone so far as to claim that virtually everything that happens in this area of the world can be viewed as part of the Saudi-Iranian power struggle” (Alsultan and Saeid, 2017, p.ix). The repercussions of failing to comprehend the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region have never been more significant, given the region’s growing importance as the world’s leading source of petroleum and the birthplace of Islamic extremist groups – so the authors. Thus, in order to understand the meaning as well as the relevance of a possible reconciliation between the two powers, it is of crucial importance understanding the reasons for their fierce opposition.
Ever since the Iranian revolution 1979, Riyadh and Tehran have identified themselves with the two opposing steams of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia, respectively, which led them to a different interpretation of their respective Islamist policy. Indeed, on one side Riyadh’s conservative monarchy, and on the other Tehran with a revolutionary theocratic republic, each asserting themselves for “speak[ing] most legitimately for Islam in the political sphere” (Gause, 2014). In the 1980s, the sectarian Sunni-Shiite division became of fundamental importance so much so that ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini publicly denounced the monarchic form as an “un-Islamic form of government” – so Gause (2014). Harsh tones came from Saudi Arabia when it claimed that Shiites were not Muslims in the proper sense of the word thereby denouncing Iran’s “quasi-democracy” achieved through the 1979 revolution. It is apparent from this that their separate governance frameworks also constitute a factor fuelling their conflict. Religious differences played a major role in their conflict, thereby indisputably affecting the Greater Middle East and the world (Mirza et al., 2021). The religious schism and, hence, conflicts between the two Muslim countries became particularly intense with the Iranian Islamic Revolution through which Tehran intended to establish a new typology of state, that is, a “revolutionary theocracy” (BBC, 2019) with the aim of implementing this model beyond its national frontiers.
Motivated by their will to each become the leader of Islam, they have been fighting for decades aiming at establishing their regional influence in the Muslim world. On one hand, Iran has been pitting Shiite Muslims in the Middle East to rise against their monarchical oppressors, while Saudi Arabia has been forging its own alliances with Sunni allies through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, 2020) and the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, which intentionally excluded Tehran. Another major point of divergence which the Islamic Republic has long insisted on, is the guardianship of the Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina, which the latter claims it should be under joint custody “by a multilateral consortium consisting of Muslims throughout the world” (Mirza et al., 2021) as, otherwise, it would enable Saudi Arabia to exercise too much of an upper hand on the Muslim world.
The spark of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has to be traced back to 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s death left a power vacuum, which sparked heated competition both within Iraq and outside the region, resulting in a civil war-like situation. Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population not only rejoiced at Saddam’s demise, but also actively participated in the new political process. Saudi Arabia feared that after his death, Iraq would revert to being an Iranian stooge, resulting in a reorganization of the regional order. The death of Saddam Hussein changed the power balance in Iran’s favour making it one of the major beneficiaries of the regime change in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran remains one of the most ardent supporters of the Iraqi government, viewing it as one of the most important strategic assets for safeguarding and promoting its interests in the Middle East (Scahill and Hussain, 2019)
Yemen, Syria and Bahrein have been the major battle ground where Tehran and Riyadh’s rivalry unfolded. They have armed rebels or governments, funded opposition groups, and started proxy wars through their affiliated groups thereby intensifying their “indirect battle”. Iran has cultivated proxies in Bahrain and has attempted to overthrow the government multiple times as it saw it as a state that should have naturally come under its influence. So, in continuity with the idea that “uprisings in Arab countries is an indication of an Islamic awakening reminiscent of the 1979 Iranian Revolution”, Tehran managed to fuel malcontent in Bahrein in the beginning of 2011 where protestors asked for freedoms, reforms, free and fair elections, and the release of prisoners. Movements quickly expanded throughout the county, erupting into an uprising against the regime and posing a difficult challenge for Saudi Arabia, which feared spillover effects. After several attempts to end the uprising, Saudi did not see any other possibility then to intervene militarily. Saudi objectives in Bahrain revolved around maintaining the status quo, ensuring survival of a friendly regime, and suppressing the uprising. As a result, a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia that had been simmering in Bahrain rose became of primary importance (Slackman, 2011).
In response to the Houthi’ rebellion to the change in government, a Saudi-led coalition launched a military operation against the Houthis at the behest of ousted Yemeni President Mansour, eventually dividing the country into pro-Houthi and pro-Mansour troops backed by Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively. This proxy war between the two regional powers has exacerbated the misery of the Yemeni people, with over half of the population in “pre-famine” conditions (Brehony, 2015).
The revolt that rose against Assad’s regime in Syria was backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United States, Turkey, and a number of other countries with the goal of toppling the Assad dictatorship. Iran, however, took a completely different stance. Syria remains Iran’s “principal center in the Levant” for power projection as it had also served as a facilitator and coordinator of its ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have been dubbed the “Axis of Resistance” in the Levant, pitting them against Israel and other regional rivals. Hence, given that Assad’s defeat and, hence, the loss of the key link in the chain would have led to limited Iranian influence over Hezbollah and even Lebanon, Tehran could not afford to assist to Assad’s defeat. To assure its survival, Iran dispatched military officers such as General Qassem Suleimani to Syria to provide training and aid. Iran’s Quds Force (IRGC-QF) not only intervened in the Syrian crisis by sending thousands of Iranians, but also recruited and trained Shi’ites from other countries to assist in the struggle. Saudi Arabia has backed protestors and criticised the Assad regime’s conduct since the beginning of the rebellion (Mirza et al., 2021). King Abdullah warned President Assad to “shut down the killing machine” (Berti and Guzansky, 2012). Soon after, Saudi military aid began to pour to the rebels, resulting in some significant tactical wins. Sunni foreign fighters, aided by Riyadh, began to oppose the regime. However, Assad’s alleged win over Daesh and opposition forces ensured Iran’s long-term strategic interest in Syria to Saudi’s detriment.
One last major concern for the Kingdom is the 2014 Iranian nuclear deal – the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) – which is considered to be a direct threat to the Saudi security and interests in the Middle East. Saudi has repeatedly expressed deep concerns as such a proposal would not stop Iran from pursuing its nuclear goals – so Riyadh. The election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his departure from the JCPOA revived Saudi Arabia’s hopes, which had finally found a president in the US who could stand up to Iran’s expanding influence in the Middle East. This, however, was not enough. On the basis of the saying “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, Saudi proposed rapprochement with Israel, who is a staunch opponent of Iran and advocate of a military action against Iran’s nuclear aims. The former also managed to persuade other main Sunni Gulf states, such as the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan, to engage in open dialogues with Israel (Mirza et al., 2021).
Tehran and Riyadh’s rivalry has ramifications that are felt throughout the Muslim world, not only in the Middle East. For example, it has spawned horizontal and vertical conflict proliferation, sectarianism, the creation of hyper-terrorist organizations (e.g., Daesh or ISIS), and, most crucially, a humanitarian catastrophe that is affecting even European governments as a result of growing migration flows. So far, Saudi Arabia and Iran have fought each other by supporting proxies in each other’s spheres of influence but the possibility of a direct confrontation cannot be ruled out, especially with the Houthis’ increasing ability to target major Saudi cities and Iran’s persistent refinement of the nuclear program. A situation like this will not bode well for the Middle East or the rest of the world (Mirza et al., 2021)
First steps towards a diplomatic dialogue
A reconciliation between Tehran and Riyadh seemed unthinkable after the escalation of their relationships in 2016 following the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, leading to the definitive interruption of diplomatic ties. However, both parties seem now to be accepting the idea of normalizing their diplomatic dialogue. A crucial role within the developments of the Saudi-Iranian relationship has been played by Iraq who, beside affirming itself as the middleman between Arab countries and Iran, has been the meditating actor between the two powers since April 2021 in the hope of re-establishing ties. (Al Jazeera, 2021). Talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran started around April 2021, when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly depicted his country as a significant partner able and prepared to collaborate with neighbouring countries to repristinate order in the region. Notwithstanding Saudi’s discordance with “Iran’s negative behaviour” – with reference to “[…] Tehran’s nuclear programme, missiles and support for proxies around the region” – Prince Mohammed claimed that Saudi is collaborating with its “[…] regional and global partners to find solutions to these problems” and is hopeful “to overcome them for good relations that benefit everyone” (Reuters, 2021).
His will of embarking on better terms with the Islamic Republic was welcomed by the latter’s foreign minister who spoke of “indications of positive signs on [the] horizon” (Reuters, 2021) thereby confirming for the first time talks with its rival aiming at reducing tensions between the two powers to pave the way for future changes in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince reinforced his stance by claiming his priority to “establish a good and distinguished relationship with Iran […]” and to collaborate with a “prosperous Iran” with which to share mutual interests (Acar, 2021). Against this background, a political source close to the Iraqi president claimed to have perceived “positive signals” from both Tehran and Saudi Arabia about their willingness to engage in more direct confrontations (Reuters, 2021).
Neither side has confirmed it yet, but several sources claimed that, among others, Tehran and Riyadh may be deciding on the future of the war in Yemen as well as on Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal, which Saudi Arabia has been fiercely countering. A crucial step forward has been reached also with other Arab states, as Iran’s ex-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif confirmed that his visit to the UAE “has been on the agenda” and, as promised, before the change of government held a diplomatic visit to Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Oman (Al Jazeera, 2021).
These improvements were soon followed by further developments at the summit held in Iraq’s capital Bagdad in late August this year aiming at encouraging peace and reconciliation in the region as well calming tensions between Tehran and Riyadh which have repeatedly brought them on the verge of initiating conflict in recent years. In this occasion, Iran’s newly appointed president Raisi affirmed that he envisages “no obstacles to restoring ties with Riyadh” and that he is prioritizing reconciliation with neighbouring counties in his foreign policy agenda (Aljazeera, 2021). The fact that representatives of both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the monarchy of Saudi Arabia attended the summit and agreed on sitting “around the same table and initiat[ing] dialogue” marks a first significant step forward not only in the improvement of their relations but also in the possibility of re-establishing stability in the Middle East – so the Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein (Aljazeera, 2021). All in all, there are strong signs that both players are keen on establishing better bilateral relations. Whether they have the power and the commitment to act in this direction is not sure yet.
What’s really behind bin Salman’s resolution intentions
Contrarily to Iran’s other major Gulf rival, the United Arab Emirates who in recent years has been fairly rapid in initiating talks with Tehran – as proved by a COVID-19 foreign ministerial summit – the Saudi monarchy has been more cautious and thoughtful when establishing reconciliation talks. Yet, its opening should come as no surprise. Indeed, experts say that Riyadh’s new dialogue with Tehran has long been on the docket and that several factors lay behinds the latter’s choice to get closer to the Islamic Republic (Ibish, 2021).
A first gradual opening towards Tehran happened during those years when the latter was undergoing major economic difficulties and social tumults as a consequence of the heavy sanctions imposed by the former Trump administration. Given that “Iran’s low-intensity, often deniable, military campaign against U.S. sanctions, under the rubric of maximum resistance” (Ibish, 2021) was heading towards a worrying direction, Riyadh affirmed that a possible conflict in its neighbouring environment arising from such conditions was not in its cards – as it would have undoubtedly directly threatened Saudi and its national security. Another determinant factor was the missile and drone attacks of September 2019 on Saudi Aramco facilities for which the monarchy openly blamed Tehran. With this action, Iran allegedly answered to the hard economic sanctions and the overall anti-Iranian strategy put in place by the former Trump administration thereby warning about the unsafety of buying Saudi oil (Rome and Johnston, 2019). Thus, the monarchy’s fear of how deep the situation had already escalated motivated it to accept the possibility of diplomatic dialogues.
Maritime security and freedom of commerce is one of the major priorities for Saudi Arabia as well as for the other Gulf countries. Reconciliations with Iran could lead to a de-escalation in the Gulf waters by driving down the attacks on ships carried out by Tehran. These were “driven by the desire to assert Tehran’s de facto right to be part of a maritime security framework in the Gulf. Iran had felt excluded from this and wanted to send the message that, if it could not sell its oil because of sanctions, its neighbours would eventually not be able to sell their oil either” (Ibish, 2021).
Ending the Sunni monarchy’s heavy reliance on oil incomes, alongside the creation of a strong economic network are among the priorities of the new figures governing the county. However, being inserted in a regional environment which is rather unstable due to the numerous civil wars Riyadh’s administration is facing, together with the financial burden of the high defence spending put in pace to limit Tehran’s expansionary behaviour, is no help. Indeed, the implementation of the desired economic transformation can happen only in circumstances of regional peace which, for the largest part, is possible only through an open dialogue with Tehran. Not only this, but better relationships with the latter would enable the monarchy to boost its economy by seizing down defence founding and invest them in other more efficient areas – thereby increasing foreign investments. Saudi’s economic recovery also depends on the war in Yemen, and as long as this resource-consuming war perpetuates economic recovery through foreign investment and financing does not really seem attainable (Acar, 2021).
Saudi Arabia’s strong will to restabilize tied with Iran is also motivated by its wish to end the war in Yemen. Indeed, the kingdom fears that Iran could protract the conflict by intensifying its support for the Houthi thereby erasing every possibility of peacebuilding. If so, given that the rebels are already proving their upper hand in the conflict, the Saudi-led coalition would be forced to be militarily employed to avoid Houthi taking over the whole county. This could take years, decades, be unlimited or even end with the defeat of the Saudi-led coalition. This is, however, what Riyadh has been avoiding for the past years. Indeed, it has repeatedly tried to put an end to its involvement in the conflict by finding a solution without, however, receiving a cooperative political answer from the Houthi – as they were rapidly conquering Yemen’s regions (DW, 2021).
Reconciliation with Iran is also fuelled by reasons of Saudi domestic policy. In particular, coming to terms would permit the Crown Prince to decrease the perception of thereat that the Saudi society and political system are already going through due to the political situation in which he finds himself. He is currently trying to offset his enemies in the House of Saud and at the same time facing the pressure of the Salafi Ulama, i.e. “the biggest partner of the establishment, regarding their projects on modernizing the country” (Acar, 2021). Not only this, but an open dialogue with Tehran would be beneficial to undermine the hawkish wing led by the Ulema – so the author.
Iranian domestic policy represents another crucial factor driving the Prince to resume relations, which was specifically worrying the monarchy in the period before the 2021 Iranian elections. As Acar (2021) explains, a possible electoral win of the hawks in Iran would further aliment military rivalry between the two actors and intensify the already profound security concerns of the Saudis. Hence, an open dialogue with Tehran is needed in order to the influence of the hawkish wing in Iranian domestic politics.
Until recently, the Gulf states were reluctant to engage in open talks with Tehran. However, compared to a few years ago, confrontations with Iran have become more feasible and cooperation less feared. Indeed, ever since 2019 the regional influence and power of the Islamic Republic have seized dramatically due to the fierce sanctions imposed by the former US administration. These led the Shia nation to lose a major part of its much-feared image that characterized it until 2015. “Its economy is badly damaged. It lost several crucial operatives, especially Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani […]. Iran has been subjected to a large series of often powerful blows by Israel, which appears to have deep intelligence penetration in Iran, especially against its nuclear program and militia proxies in Syria and Iraq […]. Iran’s strategic and political position in Syria and Iraq has declined somewhat in recent years with increasing pressure from internal and external forces seeking to weaken Tehran’s influence” (Ibish, 2019).
The potential for Iran-Saudi rapprochement is an effect of the change in direction of the Middle East policy of the new Biden administration which forced Riyadh to rethink its foreign policy. Because of the announcement that the US would carry out “a complete reset of relations with Saudi Arabia” (BBC, 2021) with human rights being in the centre, Riyad had to remedy its past actions and heal its damaged relations with US Democrats regarding – inter alia – the kingdom’s intervention in Yemen, human rights abuses, and the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Given that the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iran through the restoration of the nuclear deal appears on the very top of Biden’s political agenda, a rapprochement with Iran by the Saudi administration would be the wisest choice in order to reconciliate with the US. By doing so, Riyadh would prove that “it is not interested in serving as an obstacle to the revitalization of the JCPOA or increasing tensions in the region” (Ibish, 2019).
Furthermore, Saudi’s willingness to open conversations with Iran is also fuelled by its fear of a new version of the “Obama Syndrome” (Acar, 2021). As the author claims, Biden’s decision to end US military support of the Saudis in Yemen, to completely withdraw American troops for Afghanistan, as well as his willingness to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran perfectly resembles the choices made by the former President Barack Obama. Such actions constitute a major source of concern for the Kingdom. Indeed, just like his predecessor, Biden is now showing a reduced interest in the “security sensitivities of the Saudis” which may possibly abandon the country to Iranian influence (Acar,2021). Accordingly, the reduced US effort to support Saudi in its national security crises as well as the possibility of Tehran and Washington entertaining diplomatic relationship exclusively among each other, have led Saudi to strengthen “the push for avenues of independent action and strategic diversification” with the aim of continuing to “influence the shape of diplomacy and strategic developments in the region and secure its own interests” (Ibish, 2021).
How the EU and the US can mediate
The US and Europe have a shared interest in preventing the competition from escalating into a full-fledged confrontation, which may jeopardize regional stability and have long-term consequences for international security. As the council on Foreign Relations (2016) suggests, both Brussels and Washington together are powerful enough to mediate between Tehran and Riyadh. For the next five years, the Council proposes the following:
- introduce positive incentives to urge Iran to be more responsible, especially in terms of its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Bashar al-dictatorship Assad’s in Syria;
- investigate possible track one dialogue alternatives and expand on existing track two dialogues.
- ensure that peace discussions in Yemen are moving forward. Despite the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are already engaged in peace discussions over Syria, these efforts have failed to reduce tensions. Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran to address the conflict in Yemen could help Saudi Arabia improve its attitude toward the Houthis.
Whereas, for the next five to ten years, the Council intends to:
- boost the use of rules of the road to temper potentially dangerous Saudi-Iranian contacts in areas such as air and sea military activities, ballistic missile development, cyber interference, political and information warfare, and religious occasions such as the hajj.
- promote the formation of regional institutions and cooperative actions in areas of shared interest, such as resource management, environmental degradation, and regional infrastructure development.
- encourage significant international actors, such as the UN and major nations nurturing interest in the Gulf region, such as China and India, to participate in the region’s stabilization.
Conclusion
At the present time, the Middle East is one of the regions in the world where no state exists without a rival and no natural balance of powers is foreseen, making it one of the major hubs of world politics. The power struggle in the Middle East between Tehran and Riyadh is real. Both powers have been fighting for decades with the goal of establishing a regional order according to their own view that would promote their own interests and safeguard their national security. “The Saudi–Iran enmity is characterised by competing legitimacies. Each is Islamist in devising its political purpose, both having used that to oppose rival ideologies” (LSE Middle East Centre, 2018). Neither of the two rivals is capable of effectively defeating the other but has enough resources to continue this conflict through diplomatic, economic and military ways. However, this would permanently threaten the security of the Middle East and put its future at the mercy of this never-ending conflict.
The two Gulf enemies have a long and tortuous way ahead of them, but their slowly emerging willingness to heal relations seems promising for resuming regional and political stability in the Middle East. When developing future dialogues, each of the two powers will test the other one’s limits to see what can be achieved through dialogue as well as how deep it is eager to reconcile and, hence, how far the “rival” is willing to go to set aside its own interests and aims. However, given that none of the above-mentioned factors fuelling Saudi-Iranian relations have been settled yet – alongside the fact that both powers have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction towards one other through the decades – the present-day atmosphere characterized by their willingness to engage in constructive dialogues may only be provisional and new divergencies could arise any time, leading to new conflicts and instability in the Middle East.
Indeed, although Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s understanding of “self” and “other” has changed over the past few years, a spontaneously agreed standstill will probably not be the case in the near future. However, the present reconciliatory stance of both countries represents a perfect moment for Riyadh and Tehran to try pave the way for efficient relations and strong cooperation in the region by establishing as many “structural guardrails” as possible (Ibish, 2021). As the author continues, “ideally such talks could eventually produce a regional security framework. But even if that is unattainable under current circumstances, at least enough progress could be made to help ensure that a return to tensions causes much less harm than it otherwise might. And there is at least the prospect for the development of a virtuous circle in which small successes build on each other, leading to a stronger sense on both sides of the viability of coexistence, even in the context of continued competition”.
Indeed, “the problems of the region can only be addressed by fully functioning and resilient states under the cover of a collective security regime” (LSE Middle East Centre, 2018). This, however, would not come in form of an alliance as the two powers are characterized by stances and interests which are radically divergent. “It would not even be the shotgun marriage that characterized relations during the time of the Shah, when Cold War dynamics and a common antipathy toward leftist Arab nationalism brought Riyadh and Tehran together” (Gause, 2014). The most plausible development of their rapprochement would be grounding in an arrangement aiming at “lower[ing] the temperature of their mutual condemnations and to act with self-restraint in order to limit the regional spillovers consequences of the Syrian and Iraqi domestic conflicts” – so the author.
All in all, it would be wrong to see the clash between Tehran and Riyadh as irreversible, hopeless, and rooted in ancient aversions given that first steps towards a more open, collaborative, and diplomatic dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia are slowly taking shape. Yet, it remains further unclear how far we realistically are from a diplomatic ceasefire.
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By Elisabeth Heinz: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations
