The foundation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia has been based on the idea of an expansion of the territories controlled by the Saud family with the help of the Wahabit beduins. But as the Wahabit forces grew stronger the monarch Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud sought the cooperation of the British who were in Kuwait and Iraq. This unprecedented collaboration could have led to the British taking over total control of the coasts, and thus, the Saudis pushed back in the Arabian desert, and hence, the Saudis engaged the Americans to provide security for oil in the 1940s. At that time, the US’ domestic oil production was not sufficient anymore. To avoid an open cooperation with the US which would have raised opposition from the public and the religious leaders, American operations were covert, as in the creation of the Saudi oil company Aramco with US aid or covert arms sales and military training to the Arab forces (Roberts, 2017).
Beginning in the early 1930s, oil discoveries were made in the Persian Gulf and soon attracted foreign states. In 1933, the American Standard Oil arrived in Bahrain where commercial amounts of oil had been found only the year before (Committee on International Relation, 2012). The Saudi government granted Standard Oil a concession also in 1933, and in the following years other US companies joined after more oil discoveries. In 1950, Aramco opened a pipeline connecting Saudi Arabia to the port of Sidon, Lebanon, which was shut down in 1983; only the connection to a refinery in Jordan remained. A second large pipeline was finished in 1981 with a destination on the Persian Gulf. Control of the conglomerate passed gradually beginning in the 1970s from the US to the Saudi government which took over in 1988 renaming it Saudi Aramco (Britannica, 2021b).
The rash transformation of the region let concerns grow to establish a US presence there, not least for the geopolitical importance of the Arab peninsula along the sea lanes from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and the newly gained importance in providing oil to western markets. US foreign policy adapted to the new realities in the form of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, calling on allies to contribute to their own security aided by American security assistance (Committee on International Relation, 2012).
In the 1970s, with American troops massively engaged in Vietnam and sources for other regions sparse, the US attempted to render Iran, then still a monarchy itself, and Saudi Arabia the guardians of the Persian Gulf. Arms sales to Iran from 1970 to 1971 increased by 361% and another 16% by 1972 (Gause III, 1985). In 1975, almost half of all US arms exports (45%) went to the Gulf region (Committee on International Relations, 1975). Also, the US then started a decades-long program of constructing military bases in accordance with international standards in Saudi Arabia. In 1977, contracts for bases ran up to $20 billion; in today’s money around $500 billion (Committee on International Relations, 1977; Cunningham, 2006). Nevertheless, Iran remained the only true military power in the region, since in Saudi Arabia the armed forces was deliberately weakened to forego any military putsch against the monarchy; and a National Guard under direct Saudi family control was raised to balance the national army. In this context, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 installed a new and young Shiite regime, when Mecca was under terrorist assault. Riyadh’s first reaction, though, was to send military forces to Afghanistan in support of the jihad against the Soviet Union and to signal their support for Islam. The financial, material and religious support given to the fighters in Afghanistan created the conditions out of which al-Qaeda emerged (Roberts, 2017). As the western-friendly government in Tehran had fallen, Iran emerged as a potential menace to regional stability.
The US reaction to the developments in Iran provoked a rethinking of Washington’s attitude and strategy in the Gulf. Or in the words of President Jimmy Carter at his 1980 State of the Union address: ” An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (Committee on International Relation, 2012). The following decade would be characterized by two wars in the wider region spanning almost the whole period, the Iran-Iraq war, and a bit farther afield, the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
Saudi-Arabia, the GCC and the US
Saudi Arabia, together with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981. According to Article 4 of the GCC Charter, the alliance was founded to improve relations among the participating states and to strengthen cooperation between civilians. The GGC’s aspiration is to eventually achieve unity among member states based on common objectives and their akin political and cultural identities (Britannica, 2021a). Although prompted by the perception of a growing threat emanating from Iran – at that moment engaged in war with Iraq -, the group was explicitly not a military alliance, but aimed at primarily economic integration (Roberts, 2017). However, in 1984, the GCC established a joint military venture, the Peninsula Shield Force, which has not managed to accomplish authentic military capabilities despite annual exercises. Internal rivalries, difficulties in ceding sovereignty in the defense area, and the wish not to start an (open) arms race with Iran explain this failure (ibid.).
A decisive episode for the normalization of US military presence in the Gulf was the 1984 Tanker War in the Persian Gulf. It was a side scene of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iranian navy indiscriminately attacked oil tankers passing the Gulf in order to interrupt Iraq’s (but also GCC’s members’) trade with other countries. Initially, in 1981, Iraq began to attack all vessels going to or from Iranian ports in the northern Gulf; in 1984, Baghdad escalated its efforts with support from French aircrafts, which moved Tehran to retaliate (Strauss Center, 2008). The Gulf states turned to the US as well as the Soviet Union for aid. Washington was anxious to assure itself a presence in the region, as Soviet troops in Central Asia were only a few hundred kilometers away and not several thousand as in the case of the US (Roberts, 2017).
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it took all members of the GCC by surprise; neither the Peninsula Shield Force nor the Saudi armed forces were able to protect their ally and drive out the invader. The quickly assembled international coalition of about 750,000 troops by the US in the Gulf, the speed of victory, and the tangible proof that a country can be swiftly defeated by an unexpected event changed the internal political calculations of the GCC (Roberts, 2017). Even though the US remained unpopular with large swathes of the population, it was viewed as the smaller evil in comparison to an absence of an implicit security guarantee by American soldiers on Arab territory (ibid.). In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, all GCC states negotiated or re-negotiated access agreements for US forces; three of them even signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington: Bahrain in 1991 (with the reactivation of the Fifth Fleet in 1995), Qatar in 1992 (US Central Command headquarters established in 2002), and the United Arab Emirates in 1994 (Committee on International Relation, 2012).
Saudi overreliance for defense on the US
With US protection assured Riyadh saw no need to further develop its own forces, which became evident during the border war with the Houthi rebels in North Yemen (ibid.). It ended disastrously for the Saudi military who had planned to defeat the Houthis in short time and remove any threat from them forever. In fact, the limited campaign lasted months instead of weeks and left more than 100 Saudi troops dead, around 500 wounded and at least 26 missing (Winter, 2012). In the end, Riyadh had to negotiate a settlement with their opponents for peace and a return of prisoners of war. Saudi Arabia had come to see the Houthi rebels as solely an instrument of Iran and a menace to its southern borders, overestimating the confessional vicinity of the Zaydi branch of Islam (which is closer to Shiite than Sunni beliefs) and ignoring the local roots of their grievances (Roberts, 2017).
Since the Arab Spring, three larger developments have undermined the certainty of US support and protection. First, during the mass protests and revolts unfolding in 2011, the Americans did not lend any substantial aid to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak which looked like a capitulation to Iran in Saudi eyes and a betrayal of allies in times of domestic turmoil. Confirmation appeared to be when the US only offered scarce help to the government in Bahrain as protests broke out (Roberts, 2017). Second, US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the pivot to Asia was interpreted as growing disinterest in the region, also as the US domestic oil industry went into a shale gas boom reducing their dependence on imports from the Gulf. In fact, the naval base in Bahrain which houses the Fifth Naval Fleet was expanded then contradicting the notion of American abandonment (ibid.). Third, the conclusion of the JCPOA, again, was seen as an American betrayal offering the lifting of sanctions to Iran as a reward for producing chaos in the region – as according to Riyadh’s interpretation (ibid.).
As a result of such fears, Saudi Arabia embarked on the fruitless intervention in Yemen in 2015, which has turned into a drain on Saudi material and financial resources without a prospect of ending with any profit for Riyadh. Saudi overconfidence encountered harsh blowbacks as their overreliance on US military support has come out in the open. With the brutal engagement in the civil war in Yemen, Riyadh has been losing credit on the international stage to attract allies in their larger competition with Iran.
Saudi Arabia appears to have bet on the wrong strategy neglecting the development of its own defense capabilities, simply relying on US (and other mainly western states’) arm imports. That the Peninsula Shield Force still does not represent a functioning armed force and the failure of the current Yemen intervention are evidence of Riyadh’s military weakness. A weakness which also interests the US and Europe because of the geopolitical importance of the Arabian peninsula for the global economy. Given that fact, the stability of the wider region will warrant further western support to ensure the West’s interests there.
Bibliography
Britannica (2021a). Gulf Cooperation Council. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gulf-Cooperation-Council
Britannica (2021b). Saudi Aramco. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saudi-Aramco
Committee on International Relations (1975). United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf: Report of a Study Mission to Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. US Congress.
Committee on International Relations (1977). United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future: Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. US Congress.
Committee on International Relations (2012). the Gulf Security Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council. US Congress.
Cunningham. D.E. (2006), Veto players and civil war duration. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
Gause III, G. (1085). British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf: 1968–1973. Review of International Studies, 11(4), 264.
Roberts, D. (2017, Apr 04). More belligerent, less safe: the Saudis in the Yemeni mirror [Più bellicosi, meno sicuri: i sauditi nello specchio yemenita]. https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/piu-bellicosi-meno-sicuri-i-sauditi-nello-specchio-yemenita
Strauss Center (2008). Strait of Hormuz – Tanker War. https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-tanker-war/
Winter, L. (2012). Riyadh Enters the Yemen-Huthi Fray. The Middle East Quarterly, 19(1), 67-74.
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
