Deployed in September 2014, MINUSCA was established at an extremely critical phase of the Central African conflict. On the one hand, the conflict was characterized by inter-communal violence that the military detachments of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission (MISCA) and the French troops of the Sangaris mission were struggling to contain. On the other hand, the transitional government that had been put in place in early 2014 was not truly functional, with very limited capacity to act, including in the capital.
MINUSCA was built from its predecessor peacekeeping force, MISCA, itself a legacy of the Mission de consolidation de la paix (MICOPAX / peace consolidation mission), a mission deployed by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). As a result, the original MINUSCA troops were drawn from armies in the region (Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, etc.). They were largely ineffective and were already the subject of much criticism (allegations of abuses against civilians and sexual abuse).
Delays in recruiting staff and setting up bases meant that it took more than a year for the mission to establish itself in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since its arrival, MINUSCA’s military capacity has increased by almost 50 percent to a current strength of 14 400 military and 3 020 police, for a total of 17 420 armed personnel in the country. While the mandates given to MINUSCA by the UN Security Council have evolved since 2014, its priority task has always been the protection of the civilian population.
Demonstrations against the mission have become a regular occurrence in Bangui for several years now. A few days before the renewal of the mission’s mandate end of 2021, the presidential guard opened fire on a UN vehicle and injured ten Egyptian peacekeepers. In its escape, the vehicle fatally hit a young Central African woman. This episode is symbolic of the progressive and constant deterioration of relations between MINUSCA and the Central Africans.
Trust issues
Since its deployment in 2014, MINUSCA’s unpopularity has continued to grow and take on various forms and expressions, to the point of making “Minuscaphobia” one of the few consensual topics among Central Africans. The local media make more or less outrageous accusations against MINUSCA on a daily basis. Although the outrageousness discredit some accusations, they reflect a state of opinion and must be analyzed in order to address the problem.
Over the years, the anti-MINUSCA discourse has developed around one main argument: that the mission is contributing to the perpetuation of conflict in the country rather than reducing it. This message has been progressively reinforced through the personification of accusations and the extensive use of social networks.
First, critics claim that MINUSCA leaders have an interest in fuelling the crisis in the country in order to continue to receive their (extremely high) salaries, to profit from trafficking in natural resources, or to serve the policies of certain foreign powers (notably, France). These accusations are not just public rumor in Bangui, but are made by political authorities, including the President of the National Assembly.
Second, “Minuscaphobia” has been facilitated by the rapid expansion of social networks in the country. While in 2014 smartphones were still a privilege reserved for local elites and internet access remained highly unstable even in the capital, 8 years later, 3G connection has arrived in all major Central African cities. This allowed images of massacres by armed groups to circulate in real time and exacerbated the anti-MINUSCA discourse. Once disseminated on social networks (mainly Facebook, but increasingly also Twitter), these images are then decontextualized and instrumentalized. This is of course facilitated by the absence of an independent national media that can provide an objective version of events.
The main cause of MINUSCA’s unpopularity relates to the first priority of its mandate : the protection of civilians. Over the years, the mechanisms for civilian protection have been strengthened : deployment of additional troops, warning and contingency plans etc. However, despite these efforts, cases of late intervention or non-intervention by peacekeepers during direct attacks on the civilian population have not ceased. We can mention, among others : the riots in Bangui in September 2015 ; clashes between armed groups in Bria in November 2016 ; the burning of the Batangafo and Alindaoin November2018 ; fighting between armed groups in Birao and Ndele in September 2019 and April 2020.
Third, supposed to stabilize the security situation, MINUSCA failed to prevent the conflict from spreading to central and eastern CAR after the 2016 election.
Although MINUSCA officials have acknowledged the failure to protect civilians on some occasions, their explanations for the reasons of this failure are unconvincing and most findings of investigation reports remain confidential.
Whenever MINUSCA fails to fulfill its civilian protection mandate, two types of investigations are launched : the first is conducted by the military unit involved, which conducts an internal investigation to report back to its national government; the second is conducted under the responsibility of the Special Representative, who forms a multidisciplinary team with civilian, police, and military personnel to investigate the causes of the incident. These investigations begin promptly and the investigation reports are finalized a few months after the events. However, regardless of the outcome of the investigation, no information is made available to the families of the victims or publicly communicated.
This lack of accountability and transparency only fuels Central Africans’ distrust of MINUSCA and increases rumors and speculation about the causes of its passivity.
As a result, the annual renewal of MINUSCA’s mandate by the United Nations Security Council is met with criticism. While a few years ago these criticisms were expressed in hushed tones and came from unofficial sources, they are now public and taken up by the Central African authorities. Thus, the last renewal in November 2021 was criticized by the inhabitants of Bangui, but also by the spokesperson of the presidency.
Another considerable problem
From its inception, MINUSCA has been plagued by sexual abuse scandals. In 2015, the then head of MINUSCA, Senegalese General Babacar Gaye, had to step down because of this issue. The UN Secretary General asked him to resign following a series of accusations of child sexual abuse by peacekeepers, which he allegedly did not handle with the necessary seriousness and due diligence.
Since then, the problem has deepened. In 2017, Bishop Juan José Aguirre of Bangassou reported that women refugees at the bishop’s house were prostituting themselves to peacekeepers to obtain food. The competence of UN investigators and their procedures have also been questioned in internal evaluations. In 2019, a leaked internal UN report revealed that in 2016, approximately 130 women accused Burundian and Gabonese peacekeepers of rape, sexual abuse, and exploitation in the town of Dékoa, but more than half of their complaints were dismissed by the investigators deployed there.
The leaked internal report describes the clumsiness of the investigations and how the women were left to fend for themselves.
That year, nearly one-third of the sexual abuse cases reported by the UN in its 15 peacekeeping missions worldwide involved MINUSCA. Given the magnitude of the problem, it is not surprising that MINUSCA is not the only mission in the world to be affected. Given the magnitude of the problem, several contingents were dismissed from the mission.
Faced with daily criticism, MINUSCA leaders generally respond that Central Africans do not understand the mission’s mandate and that the mission is the target of a deliberate disinformation campaign, particularly on social networks. In a country where rumor is the common form of information circulation, MINUSCA leaders are therefore emphasizing communication policy and redoubling their efforts to get their message across, particularly through their own media outlet, Radio Guira FM. MINUSCA’s communications department responds to the most serious accusations and highlights the mission’s security operations and activities for the benefit of the Central African population and administration. This service emphasizes the limits of MINUSCA’s mandate through media campaigns as well as training and awareness sessions for specific audiences (journalists, opinion leaders, etc.).
This strategy of emphasizing communication policy has two explicit limitations. On the one hand, it only targets a very small portion of the Central African population: those who have regular contact with MINUSCA through their role in the community, and those (often the same people) who have sufficient skills to understand the subtleties and challenges of the mandate. On the other hand, while increased communication from MINUSCA may counter some of the misinformation campaigns, it also risks being equated with propaganda and the causes of “Minuscaphobia” are not addressed.
To do this, the UN should improve the effectiveness of its protection of civilians by peacekeepers, strengthen controls on its personnel, be more transparent in its investigations and sanctions, and take into account local perceptions of its policy choices. What would help tremendously is trying to educate local personnel so that Central Africans protect themselves with the help of the MINUSCA mission and the peacekeepers, and not have UN employ personnel from outside countries in Central Africa for its peacekeeping mission.
https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/press-release-15-september-2021
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100032
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1107832
https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/EPON-MINUSCA-Report.pdf
https://www.dw.com/fr/réactions-après-le-renouvellement-du-mandat-de-la-minusca/a-59818974
Examples of anti-Minusca journals :
https://lavoixdessansoix.wordpress.comhttps://lepotentielcentrafricain.com
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
