One of the principal objectives of peace processes is to end armed fighting; however, there has almost never been reported cases in which violence has effectively stopped following the start of the negotiations. As a matter of fact, violence tends to increase right before, during or immediately following the signing of a peace agreement. The subsequent time after having signed a peace agreement is one of the riskiest of the peace process in that violence could easily erupt. A comprehension regarding to what extent acts of violence affect peace process is needed as well as it has to be understood why those who do not agree with peace solutions might manifest their disagreement with violence, sometimes express such disunity trough terrorist attacks.
It is clear that when violence disrupts a peace process, peace implementation is at jeopardy. The most evident scenario is the threat of re-escalation of the armed conflict, notwithstanding the fact that other outcomes might manifest. However, since the focus here is on terrorism, it is important to highlight that while violence during peace processes aimed at ending armed conflicts is common, not every act labeled as terrorism can be associated to a war. As a matter of facts, the phenomenon of terrorism is multifaceted and, most importantly, acts of terror may have different foundations. This notwithstanding, as regards to processes aimed at managing peace after armed conflicts spoiled by violence ascribable as terrorism, it must be accentuated that such acts are called “conflict-related terrorism” or “conflict-generated terrorism”.
In point of fact, conflict-generated acts of terror are used as a tactic by militant groups who do not agree with what has been decided by the peace talks and which want to associate their actions with a specific political agenda. Concrete cases have demonstrated that the terrorists’ cause may be quite aspiring; as a matter of fact, their goal should be that of seize power, create a new State and, among others, fight until defeating the enemy, so as to impose the militant group’s conducting the act of terror own terms of peace. However, it has to be stated that, although this causes violence to continue, generally, acts of terror do not go beyond a local or regional context and are, therefore, localized. This notwithstanding, logistical, propaganda, and planning activities may be internationalized, meaning that the preparation of the terrorist attack may be organized in and from the territory of other States that are not belligerent in that armed conflict. An example of what has been stated may be the case of the Tamil Tigers. Moreover, in addition to the mentioned narrow political agenda, those conducting terrorist attacks before, during or after a peace process usually have limited means at their disposal to perpetrate the attack. In point of facts, it is common that weapons and materials utilized in terrorist activities in such contexts are not advanced; in fact, such weapons tend to be standard, relatively available, and are sometimes quite primitive as well, such as the bombs used by Palestinian suicide bombers. This is intended to mean that acts of terror appear to be the best suited tactic to disrupt a peace process.
Assuming that it is unclear to comprehend who has the right to make the judgement about whether the spoiler’s demands are legitimate and should be accommodated as part of the peace process, it is now appropriate to understand what the effective modalities aimed at countering terrorist activities directed at destabilizing peace processes are. In point of facts, such spoilers must be neutralized and the most judicious way to do this is to deprive them of their key advantage by introducing more active cooperation between counter-terrorist actors and find ways to formalize informal links within the spoilers’ organizations. Since delinking the political process from anti-terrorism concerns is not an effective long-term strategy, the most logical and standard way to achieve this is to encourage both the general demilitarization and the political transformation of the armed groups themselves, stimulating them to increasingly politicize themselves and engage in non-militant activities, as well as to form distinctive and full-fledged political wings, so that these political wings can gradually develop and transform into political parties, and eventually be incorporated into the political process. Although it has to be recognized that the process of political transformation does not necessarily lead to the definitive rejection of violence by a group, it may facilitate and contribute to the marginalization of its more radical elements. In fact, these groups cannot be ignored and left out of the peace process without significantly damaging the process itself.
References:
STEPANOVA, Terrorism as a tactic of spoilers, in NEWMAN, RICHMOND, Challenges to peacebuilding: managing spoilers during conflict resolution, United Nations University Press, 2006
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
